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In the last few years a growing number of academic works have analyzed the past and 
the present of the Eastern Mediterranean region arguing that Western powers 
«created artificial nations» and that most of the modern states in the area are 
deprived of peculiar historical legacies. The narrative of the Islamic State (IS) that is 
now trying to erase the «Sykes-Picot order» – reproduced in Western media and 
discourse – is largely based on similar assumptions. This article challenges these 
arguments and contends that, if not considered in a critical way, the process of 
simplification  experienced by the region between the last decades of the nineteenth 
and the first decades of the twentieth centuries can itself trigger simplificative 
assumptions. The cultural and political evolution of many of the countries in the 
region shows a much more complex historical development than what the Sykes-Picot 
(and the related IS) narrative would suggest: most of the states in the region are not 
simply «artificial creations» and old maps should not be used, once again, to cover a 
complex local reality. 
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«Haughty as a Persian, tender as a 
Syrian / elegant as an Iraqi, eloquent as a 
Hijazi»1. 
Twelfth-century Syrian poet Ibn 
Munir al-Tarabulsi writing about his 
male beloved. 
 
«Before nationalist doctrines were 
imported from Europe, “patriotic” 
identities had already taken shape in 




Gertrude of Arabia, the woman who invented Iraq»3. This is the title of an 
article published in June 2014 by Clive Irving on the «Daily Beast». It is 
one of a long series of journalistic and academic works that in recent 
months and years have linked the ongoing civil war in the country to the 
invention of an Iraqi nation at the hands of Gertrude Bell (1868-1926) and a small 
group of British personalities. Similar analysis have recently appeared also in relation 
to Palestine, Syria and several other areas in the region. The impression that is often 
conveyed through these publications is that the West «created artificial nations»4 and 
that the Islamic State (IS) is now trying, as claimed by its leaders, to erase the Sykes-
Picot order imposed on the region. 
This article aims to question these increasingly common claims. The first part 
focuses on modern maps and show the processes through which the Eastern 
Mediterranean – and in particular the area encompassed by present-day Syria, 
                                                 
* A lecture on the issues analyzed in this article has been delivered by the author at Harvard 
University‟s Center for Middle Eastern Studies on November 3, 2014. It has been presented also 
at SOAS, University of London, on December 7, 2014. The author wishes to thank the 
participants for their suggestions and discussions which have led to many improvements. 
1 Cit. in MUHANNA, Elias, «Iraq and Syria‟s Poetic Borders», in The New Yorker, 13 August 
2014, URL: < http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/iraq-syria-poetic-imagination > 
[consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
2 OSTERHAMMEL, Jurgen, The Transformation of the World, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, p. XIX. 
3 IRVING, Clive, «Gertrude of Arabia, the Woman Who Invented Iraq», in The Daily Beast, 17 
June 2014, URL: < http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/17/gertrude-of-arabia-the-
woman-who-invented-iraq.html > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
4 POLNER, Murray, WOODS, Thomas E., We who Dared to Say No to War: American Antiwar 
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Palestine, Israel and Lebanon – has been simplified in late Ottoman times and under 
British and French influence. Taking Iraq, Syria and Palestine as case studies, the two 
paragraphs that follow shed light on how this process of simplification, and the Sykes-
Picot and IS‟s narratives, continue to be often (mis)used to foster the claim that local 
states (that are political entities) and nations (in the sense of cultural communities, or, 
to borrow a term from the Indian context, Rashtra) are simply «Western artificial 
creations». The conclusions turn the attention on the efforts that the peoples in the 
Eastern Mediterranean are now exerting in order to find their own peculiar ways to get 
back into history, overcoming their simplified pasts. 
 
1. Maps’ spatial agenda 
 
The imposition of borders – «blurred, imprecise, fuzzy»5 – and the divide-and-rule 
policies carried out by European powers in the Eastern Mediterranean fomented 
sectarian tensions and triggered some of the most relevant conditions for the perpetual 
«condition of colonization»6 registered in the area following World War I.  
Two set of maps have been especially influential in this process and in crystallizing 
the fragmentation of the region within the area encompassed in present-day Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
The first one is the Carte du Liban, a map produced in 1862 by the French Corps 
Expéditionnaire de Syrie, that arrived in Mount Lebanon in order to find a solution for 
the civil war between Maronites and Druzes: a bloody strife that the European powers‟ 
strategies in the area contributed to ignite7. 
As already happened six decades earlier in Egypt, when Napoleon (1769-1821) 
involved in his expedition a large number of cartographers and scholars (the Rosetta 
Stone was re-descovered at the time), also in the Sixties of the Nineteenth century the 
French brought with them, beside military forces, several renowned scholars. The latter 
were headed by Ernest Renan (1823-1892), who surveyed the region and drew the first 
modern map of the area. The map stretched from Nahr el Kabir in the North to a line 
that in the South runs from Al-Naqurah to the Lake Hula. It was reprinted twice during 
World War I and, beside being used by Lebanese nationalists such as Henry Lammens 
                                                 
5 FERABOLLI, Silvia, Arab Regionalism, London, Routledge, 2015, p. 60. 
6 Tamim al-Barghuti noted that when the colonial powers were strained during the two world 
wars, «their Middle Eastern colonies got their formal independence and, because of the way 
they were structured and the elites that governed them, continued to behave as colonies». AL-
BARGHUTI, Tamin, The Umma and the Dawla, London, Pluto Press, 2008, p. 4. 
7 HAKIM, Carol, The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1920, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2013, p. 8. 
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(1862–1937), was brought by the Maronite patriarch Iliyas al-Huwayik (1843-1931) to 
the 1919‟s Paris Conference to persuade the French to accept the idea of «le Grand 
Liban», which meant, in the patriarch‟s words, «la restitution au Liban de ses limites 
naturelles et historiques, telles qu‟elles ont été tracées par l‟état-major français dans le 
carte de 1860»8.  
Following the Paris Conference, the French High Commission preferred to ignore a 
more detailed map of the area produced by the Ottomans in 1911, opting instead, once 
again, for the Carte du Liban. It was in fact the 1862‟s map to be used during the 
Paulet–Newcombe Agreement, the Franco-British Boundary Agreements signed 
between Paris and London 1920-23 with the aim to determine the final tre-border area 
between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, as well as the regional three-border point 
junction. The final lines drawn in February 1923 on the map produced by Ernest Renan 
61 years earlier created tensions that in many cases are still affecting the daily life in the 
region. In Asher Kaufman‟s words: 
 
According to this map [the map of 1923], the tri-border meeting place is in the 
village of Ghajar, whereas Jisr al-Ghajar, the ancient Roman bridge that was in fact 
the tri-border meeting point until 1967 and is still regarded as such according to 
international law, lies about 3 kilometers south of the tri-border point, inside 
Syrian territory. Indeed, the village of Ghajar itself is located within Syrian territory 
because the wide borderline runs on the western or right bank of the Hasbani 
River. The “bend” is clearly marked on the map but it is drawn some 5 kilometers 
north of the village of Ghajar along the Hasbani River. The map has been somewhat 
prophetic, given that since its foundation Lebanon has evolved into unstable 
political entity9. 
 
Arif Dirlik argued that «to define, as to name, is to conquer»10, while James C. Scott 
emphasized that maps «are designed to summarize precisely those aspects of a complex 
world that are of immediate interest to the map-maker and to ignore the rest»11. Thus, 
maps are rarely, if ever, neutral; they almost always express a particular spatial agenda: 
Carte du Liban represents the geo-body on which the regional spatial agenda was 
framed. 
                                                 
8 Cit. in FIRRO, Kais, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate, 
London, I.B. Tauris, 2003, p. 18. 
9 KAUFMAN, Asher, Contested Frontiers in the Syria-Lebanon-Israel Region: Cartography, 
Sovereignty, and Conflict, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014, p. 27. 
10 DIRLIK, Arif, What is in a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea, Lanham, 
Rowman, 1998, p. 5. 
11 SCOTT, James C., Seeing like a State, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p. 87. 
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But perhaps more than from the Carte du Liban, the development of the regional 
«spatial agenda» have been shaped by the maps produced by the Palestine Exploration 
Fund. When, in the second half of the 1860s, Charles William Wilson (1836-1905)12 and 
other members of the PEF arrived in Palestine to conduct the first modern 
archaeological and topographical investigations, their purpose was to provide «the 
most definite and solid aid obtainable for the elucidation of the most prominent of the 
material features of the Bible»13. More specifically, they were not interested in the sites 
connected to the New Testament, but rather in those cited in the Old Testament. This 
choice was due to the fact that the places mentioned in the New Testament – more 
precisely the ones discovered until that time – were already under the direct control of 
the Orthodox Christians, as well as of the Catholics and other non-Protestant 
denominations. More importantly, this was traceable to the desire to connect Anglican 
Protestantism to the ancient Israelites and thus to the concept of «chosen people». As 
had already happened thirteen centuries before with the Welsh cleric Gildas (500c.–
570)14, the purpose was clear: to create a parallel to show that the ancient «chosen 
people», the Israelites, had been replaced by the new «chosen people», the English15. 
Beside these aspects, what is particularly noteworthy in the frame of the present 
analysis is that the maps produced by the PEF were tools that in a first phase (1871-
1884), through the geo-theology of PEF, fished in the mythical past of Biblical Palestine 
to apply it to that present reality, and that subsequently, beginning with World War I 
and due to a selective choice of colors, dimensions and names, imposed a mental 
                                                 
12 On 25 September 1865 the president of the PEF (E. Ebor) asked to the Secretary of State for 
the War, Marquis of Ripon (1827-1909), the permission to give Wilson the task of investigating 
«the Holy Land in a more accurate and systematic manner than has yet been done». The 
National Archive [hereafter: TNA] OS (Ordinance survey) 1/17/1. The year before (1864) Wilson 
was in Jerusalem working on a project to improve the water system of the city. He took this 
opportunity to produce some remarkable maps. Regarding Muslims in Jerusalem, Wilson wrote 
that they «belong for the most part to the same race as the peasantry of Palestine, 
representatives it may be, though with a large intermixture of foreign blood, of the Jebusite that 
dwelt in the land». WILSON, Charles W., Picturesque Palestine, Sinai, and Egypt, New York, 
Appleton, 1881, p. 118. 
13 In Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund, London, Palestine Exploration 
Fund, 1871, p. 3. 
14 De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae is the title of the most ancient surviving manuscript ever 
written by a British author about the story of Albion. It was composed around 564 CE by the 44 
years old Welsh cleric Gildas. Although it did not host any Jewish communities at the time, Great 
Britain is referred to as «the new Israel» and the battles of this „holy nation‟ (goy kadosh: Exodus 
19:6) against «barbarian invaders» are compared to the battles of ancient Israel against 
Babylonians and Philistines. BLMC – HP – MS. 522, Gildas’ Chronicle 1525, p. 76. Two 
centuries later, in 731, Venerable Bede (672c.–735) wrote the Historia ecclesiastica gentis 
Anglorum. Here some themes in Gildas‟s work were repeated, such as the perception of being 
«God‟s chosen people» and «the new Israel». See BEDE, The Ecclesiastical History of the 
English Nation, New York, Cosimo, 2007 [1474]. 
15 See MOSCROP, John J., Measuring Jerusalem: the Palestine Exploration Fund and British 
interests in the Holy Land, New York, Leicester University Press, 2000, p. 2. 
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framework destined to shape the future of the region.  
PEF‟s obstinacy to identify symbols in addition to well defined borders, using for 
this a plethora of terms on their maps (international boundary, village boundary, 
district boundary, subdistrict boundary, fiscal block boundary, municipal boundary, 
triangulation point boundary, quarter boundary, qita‟ boundary), did not respond to 
any need of the local populations. The latter were mostly ignored, showing what 
Beshara Doumani defined as «the amazing ability to discover the land without 
discovering the people»16.  
Israeli antropologist Efrat Ben Ze‟ev and other scholars went a step forward in 
assessing the consequences of PEF‟s maps claiming that the fact that the members of 
the PEF succeded to map only the area to the West of the Jordan river represented «the 
first unintended step toward the emergence of separate entity in Western Palestine»17. 
For its local majority, and more in general for most of the Islamic believers, the 
awareness and the perception that «Filastin», mentioned in many classical sources as 
«Al ‘Ard al Muqaddasa‟» (the Holy Land)18, was a special area and therefore distinct 
from Syria, Jordan and Lebanon19, cannot be considered but a «first uninteded step» 
that predated the PEF of many centuries. It is undeniable, however, that maps like the 
Carte du Liban and the ones of the PEF, played a crucial role in shaping the post World 
War I‟s Middle East. Those same maps were also used in 1917/18 during the conquest 
                                                 
16 DOUMANI, Beshara, «Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History», 
in Journal of Palestine studies, 21, 2/1992, p. 8.  
17 BEN ZE‟EV, Efrat, Remembering Palestine in 1948, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2011, p. 29. 
18 See for instance the tafsir (exegesis) of the Qur‟an written by Tabari (838–923). TABARI, 
Jami’ al-Bayan ‘an Ta’wil al-Quran [The Clear Collection Regarding the Interpretation of the 
Qur’an], 15 voll., Beirut, ed. Sidqi Jamil al-’Attar, 2001, [883]. For a later source see MUJIR AL-
DIN, Al-Uns al-Jalil bi-Tarikh al-Quds wa ‘l-Khalil [The Glorious History of Jerusalem and 
Hebron], vol. 1, Najaf, al-Haydariya, 1968 [1595], pp. 65, 66, 71, 94, 101. The subject is dealt with 
also in FAHIM GABR, Al-Ard al-Muqaddasa [The Holy Land], Nablus, Al-Najah University, 
1983. 
19 An Islamic text from the eighth century, attributed to the medieval scholar Abu Khalid Thawr 
Ibn Yazīd al-Kala‟i (764–854), argued that «the holiest place [al-quds] on Earth is Syria; the 
holiest place in Syria is Palestine; the holiest place in Palestine is Jerusalem [Bayt al-maqdis]». 
Cit. in ESS, Josef Van, Abd al-Malik and the Dome of the Rock: an analysis of some texts, in 
RABY, Julian, JOHNS, Jeremy (eds.), Bayt Al-Maqdis, vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1992, pp. 89-90. Detailed references to Palestine, not necessarily of a strictly religious nature, 
can be found in the Kitab al-Buldan (Book of Countries) by the Shi‟i historian al-Ya‟qubi (?–897) 
and in Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik (The Book of the Routes and Realms) by the Persian 
geographer al-Iṣṭakhrī (?–957). «Filastin», al-Iṣṭakhri wrote, «is the most fertile among the 
Syrian provinces […] In the province of Filastin, despite its narrowness, there are around twenty 
Mosques […] At its maximum extension [Filastin goes] from Rafh [Rafah] to the edge of al-
Lajjun [Legio], a traveler would need two days to travel across its entire length; and [this is also] 
the time [necessary] to cross the province across its breadth from Yafa [Jaffa] to Riha [Jericho] 
[…]». Cit. in and translated by LE STRANGE, Guy, Palestine Under the Moslems: A Description 
of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500, London, Watt, 1890, p. 28. 
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of Palestine by General Edmund Allenby (1861-1936) and his troops20. 
 
2. Iraq, Syria and the Sykes-Picot narrative 
 
Maps, borders, toponyms: each of these topics played a meaningful role in the 
«process of simplication» suffered not only, but particularly, by this region in the last 
few centuries. If not considered in the proper way, however, these claims can 
themselves trigger some simplificative assumptions. The modern-states in the region 
were far from representing well-defined and uniform geographic, social, political or 
cultural entities. Yet, the cultural and political evolution of countries such as Iraq – 
possibly derived from Sumerian «Uruk» – and Syria – al-Sham («the left»)21 in Arabic 
sources; Syria was coined by the Greeks from «Assyria» in the sixth century BCE – 
shows a much more complex historical development than what the Sykes-Picot 
narrative would suggest22. Societal attitutes towards the state have developed through 
several stages,23 In other words, and contrary to a common understanding, Palestine, 
Iraq and Syria are not simply artificial creations and while it is necessary to reject any 
«primordialist temptation» – or the existence of communities which have been 
defining themselves on a territorial basis for ages – it is equally important to pay 
attention to the «traces of awarness of territorial consciousness»24 and thus to avoid 
that old maps could be used, once again, to cover a complex local reality. 
A number of scholars are increasingly focusing on the thesis of the «end of the 
Sykes-Picot order». If this claim has a meaning it is mainly because the Sykes-Picot 
system postponed the rising of a new order shaped from within the region. Rather than 
linking what is happening in the Middle East to the end of the Sykes-Picot order it 
                                                 
20 During his campaign, Allenby relied on a number of maps and sources, including the 
intelligence provided by Nili, a Jewish spying organization which assisted London in Ottoman 
Palestine during World War I. See LIVNEH, Eliezer, Nili: Toldoteha shel He’azah Medinit [Nili: 
The History of a Political Daring], Jerusalem, Shoken, 1961. PEF‟s maps, despite having being 
produced several years earlier, maintained nonetheless a meaningful and practical role in 
supporting British efforts. 
21 Al-Shām, or, facing where the sun rises, the land to «the left» of Mecca. This vaguely defined 
area was roughly coincident to what the Persians called Eber-Nari («Across the River»), the 
Crusaders «Outre-mer» («Overseas») and the Italians (and others) Levant, that is 
«Mediterranean lands east of Italy». 
22 See on this also PURSLEY, Sara, «Lines Drawn on an Empty Ma‟: Iraq‟s Borders and the 
Legend of the Artificial State», in Jadaliyya, 2 June 2015, URL: 
<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21759/lines-drawn-on-an-empty-map_iraq‟s-
borders-and-the > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
23 DODGE, Toby, «Can Iraq be Saved?», in Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56, 5/2014, 
pp. 7-20, p. 10. 
24 GERBER, Haim, «„Palestine‟ and other territorial concepts in the 17th century», in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30, 4/1998, pp. 563-572, p. 563. 
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would be therefore more accurate to refer to the final point of an historical impasse that 
lasted for almost one century. 
The main representatives of the IS – formerly «Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant» (it was renamed in order to deny the existence of regional divisions and 
differences) – have pointed out in several occasions that they aim to erase the Sykes-
Picot order, and several Western media seem largely to accept this narrative. In truth, 
by the end of World War I the Sykes-Picot Agreement was already a dead letter and 
virtually all the issues (including the internazionalization of Jerusalem) discussed in 
1915-16 have not being implemented, or are no longer relevant since many decades. 
Sykes-Picot, for instance, aimed to divide present-day Syria and Iraq into three or four 
states, while the San Remo conference of 1920 explicitly postponed the determination 
of the borders. A closer look to the issue suggests that the IS approach and the Sykes-
Picot order represent two faces of the same coin: both base/based their approaches on a 
a-historical and falsely constructed vision of the past and both mirror their interests 
more than the realities in the region. 
Contrary to the IS‟s narrative, modern-day Syria and Iraq have both several 
meaningful antecedents in the pre-Islamic world. Focusing for instance on the thesis of 
a «divided and artificial Iraq», what nowadays would be referred to as a non-sectarian 
patriotism has indeed more complex roots in the Iraqi context than often claimed. For 
long time such feeling proved tendentially stronger and more rooted than sectarianism. 
A study conducted by a group of Iraqi intellectuals for a Norwegian think tank clarified 
this aspect pointing out for example that the claim that Iraq is an artificial creation 
concocted by the British after World War I overlooks the fact that «the separation 
between the three Ottoman provinces that was in place in 1914 dated back only 30 
years, to 1884»25. For much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries those same 
three Ottoman provinces – Basra, Baghdad, Mosul – were governed as a single entity 
with Baghdad as their center of gravity. Already at the time numerous local intellectuals 
indicated the area as «Iraq», while the expression «the region of Iraq» (iklim-i Irak) 
can be found already in early eighteen-century Ottoman chronicles such as Gulshan-i 
khulafa (1730)26. It is certainly true that a clear-cut border between the two countries 
was outlined only in 1918-1920, – mainly as a result of the efforts made by a group of 
                                                 
25 «More than „Shiites‟ and „Sunnis‟ – How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and 
Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq», in Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
Report, February 2009, URL: 
<http://english.nupi.no/content/download/8891/91333/file/Iraq%20Report%20%284%29.pdf
> [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
26 See VISSER, Reidar, «Historical Myths of a Divided Iraq», in Survival, 50, 2/2008, p. 103. 
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Iraqi officers enlisted in the Syrian army27 – but the claim that «the only person who 
ever really believed Iraq existed was Saddam Hussein»28 is a common yet misleading 
simplification that implictly suggests the need to impose new borders based on 
sectarian lines. This option, increasingly mentioned in the public debates that are 
taking place particularly in Europe and the US, would represent another imposition of 
Western power destined to trigger more violence. 
In July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the IS‟s leader, delivered his first public talk 
from Mosul‟s Great Mosque of Nur al-Din (1118–1174), a prominent figure who fought 
against the Crusaders and established a brief kingdom in several areas encompassed 
within present-day Iraq and Syria. This particular location was chosen to further 
strenghten one of the main mediatic messages of the IS: «This blessed advance will not 
stop», clarified al-Baghdadi, «until we hit the last nail in the coffin of the Sykes–Picot 
conspiracy»29. In other words, the entire area, in the eyes of al-Baghdadi and his 
followers, represents a monolithic Islamic state in which spatial divisions are deprived 
of any legitimacy. 
However and despite the supposed unification of the Islamic world under the 
caliphs, for large part, if not most, of their histories Iraq and Syria have been ruled by 
distinct regimes. The Lakhmids (300-600), for instance, ruled large parts of 
contemporary Iraq, while the Ghassanid Kingdom, in the sixth century, was located in 
much of present-day Syria. Under the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), that had 
Damascus as capital, Iraq was a center of dissent, and when in 750 the Abbassids 
succeeded to overthrow the Umayyads, they moved their capital from Damascus to the 
newly-built Baghdad. In the centuries to follow the two areas were often ruled 
separately, or through distinct administrative units. According to Medieval sources, the 
approximate borders of Syria and Iraq «overlap significantly with the modern ones»30. 
This means that IS‟s aim to «erase Sykes-Picot» is largely «rooted in fiction, not 
history»31. 
What has been claimed up to now is not meant to suggest that the various local 
                                                 
27 AL-TALA‟FARI, Qahtan Ahmad „Abush, Thawrat Tall ‘Afar 1920 [Telfar’s revolution in 
1920], Baghdad, Matba‟at al-Azhar, 1969, p. 418.  
28 RICH, Paul J., Iraq And Gertrude Bell’s The Arab Of Mesopotamia, Lanham, Lexington 
Book, 2008, p. XXIX. 
29 AL-BAGHDADI, Abu Bakr, Great Mosque of Nūr al-Din, 5 July 2014, URL:  
< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1uLIcCwsn0#t=1m7s > [consulted on 14 February 
2016]. 
30 MUHANNA, Elias, op. cit. 
31 GORDON, Jennifer Thea, «ISIS‟ Desire to Erase Sykes-Picot Is Rooted in Fiction, Not 
History», in The National Interest, 17 September 2014, URL:  
< http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis‟-desire-erase-sykes-picot-rooted-fiction-not-history-
11293 > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
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ethnic groups were in need of well-defined borders, nor intends to downplay London‟s 
historical role regarding the problems that are still affecting the region. It aims instead 
to emphasize that the modern and contemporary Iraqi identity has been «imagined» 
and «constructed» like any other identity in history32 and that it is at that complex and 
shared identity – often stronger than sectarian divisions – toward which a considerable 
majority of the populations (70 percent, according to a survey conducted in 2008 by 
the Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies) is looking at. 
It is the very idea of an Iraq divided on sectarian or ethnic lines that appears 
problematic. The local reality, as the one in most of the rest of the region, is not 
characterized by homogeneous communities. Many ethnicities in Iraq have Sunni and 
Shia branches that exist parallel to sectarian identity. This is particularly meaningful 
considering that, with some analogies to the history of the last decade, only following 
three invasions coming from areas external to modern Iraq – the Safavids in 1508 and 
1623, and the Wahhabi sack of Karbala in 1801 – did bloody sectarian clashes occur in 
the region.  
It is certainly true that in early medieval Baghdad occurred some sectarian clashes, 
but that, as noted by Fanar Haddad, «is extremely different from what you have in the 
age of the nation state»33. Despite the (relatively recent) process of ethnicization of 
religious identities, still today Baghdad hosts about a million Kurds – whose communal 
mobilization revolves around an ethnic pole rather than a sectarian one – who have 
never suffered from violence of a sectarian nature; a fifth of the population of Basra are 
Sunni, while in Samarra, a predominantly Sunni city, there are two of the most 
important Shiite ruins. The provinces of Diyala and Salah al-Din have for centuries 
been the image of a multi-ethnic Iraq in which the splitting of one or more of its 
component parts cannot but trigger more violence and ethnic cleansing34. This is not a 
way to suggest the necessity of framing Iraq‟s past and preent in terms of a-sectarian 
nationalism, but aims instead to highlight that specificities of time and place should 
return to their inclusive original dimension. The awareness of this – an antidote to the 
rise of IS, to the policies of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and the sectarian-
                                                 
32 Back in 1939 Richard Hartshorne (1899-1992) argued that «any attempt to divide the world 
involves subjective judgement, not in the determination of the limit of individual factors, but in 
deciding which of several factors is to be regarded as most important». HARTSHORNE, 
Richard, The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the 
Past, Lancaster, Association of American Geographers, 1939, pp. 296-297. 
33 HADDAD, Fanar, Sectarianism in Iraq. Antagonist Visions of Unity, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011.  
34 «The real roots of Iraq‟s Sunni-Shia conflict», in Vox, 20 June 2014, URL:  
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based quotas introduced following the US invasion of 2003 – represents the 
cornerstone on which to start the process of reconstruction of the Iraqi nation35.  
 
3. The Palestinian context as a case study 
 
Every country and every ethnic group has a different history, but the tendency to 
deny or downplay local peculiar identities and geographical specifities can be detected 
also in reference to many other areas in the Eastern Mediterranean area. This is 
particularly true for Palestine and the Palestinians, on which this section will focus36. 
In the frame of the process of «simplification of the others» analyzed above 
Palestinians and the Palestinian context stand out as a distinct case. Despite being 
firmly rooted in the history of the broader region, in some respects the «Holy Land» 
represents in fact an unicum which eludes combinations that are valid in other 
contexts. No other context area where the histories of a land and of its peoples have 
been equally instrumentalized (William Blake [1757-1827], for instance, referred to 
Jerusalem describing it as a «lovely Emanation of Albion»37, wondering if Britain was 
«the primitive seat of the patriarchal religion»)38. Nowhere the merging of religion, 
imperialism, colonialism, and Orientalism have been more successful. It is hard, in 
conclusion, to figure out an area of the world in which the rising of an alternative and 
inclusive local history has been more hindered39. 
It is perhaps «Biblical Orientalism» – a sui generis and under-researched variant of 
Orientalism, to which Edward Said (1935-2003) did not devote the attention one might 
have expected40 – to represent one of the most effective tools for shedding light on the 
peculiar way through which the process of «simplification of the others» was applied in 
the specific Palestinian context. Biblical Orientalism can be defined as a phenomenon 
based on the combination of a selective use of religion (Bible) and a simplifying way to 
                                                 
35 KAMEL, Lorenzo, «Despite the Popular Narrative, Iraq is not Simply an Artificial Creation», 
in The National, 12 October 2014, URL: < http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/despite-the-
popular-narrative-iraq-is-not-simply-an-artificial-creation > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
36 This section is partially derived from KAMEL, Lorenzo, Imperial Perceptions of Palestine: 
British Influence and Power in Late Ottoman Times, London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2015. 
37 BLAKE, William, Jerusalem: the Emanation of Giant Albion, London, William Blake, 1804, p. 
146. 
38 Ibidem, p. 171. 
39 KAMEL, Lorenzo, «The impact of „Biblical Orientalism‟ in late 19th and early 20th century 
Palestine», in New Middle Eastern Studies, 4, 2014, pp. 1-15. 
40 As noted by Bar-Yosef, the «Holy Land is rather marginalized in Orientalism. […] [Edward] 
Said very rarely stops to think about the distinct nature Western interests in the Holy Land, 
which might distinguish it from other Orientalist encounters». BAR-YOSEF, Eitan, The Holy 
Land in English Culture, 1799-1917, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 6. 
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approach its natural habitat: the «Holy Land». It acted on various levels with lasting 
consequences. A plethora of books, private diaries and maps, in addition to later 
phenomena such as the «evangelical tourism» inaugurated by Thomas Cook (1808-
1892), instilled in Britain and beyond what Meron Benvenisti defined as «the 
imaginary perception of Palestine based on the Bible»41. 
Such enormous production, often focused on the links between Biblical events and 
the physical characteristics of Palestine, favored the affirmation of an historical 
chronology that had the tendency to focus almost exclusively on Biblical times and the 
Crusades, largely ignoring millennia of pre-Biblical history and centuries of Islamic 
domination. This contributed to fix in the Western collective memory toponyms that 
have in various forms covered up the original «non-Biblical» geography, and spread the 
idea that the names used by the local majority to refer to local millenarian cities were 
nothing but awkward attempts to distort, «arabizing»42 and «bastardizing» them, 
names of ancient Israelite cities: a perception that, although often unfounded, has had 
repercussions visible up to the present day. 
Already in the sixteenth century the maps produced by Dutch cartographer 
Abraham Ortelius (1527-1598) instilled the idea of a «meta-Palestine» devoided of any 
history except that of biblical gloriousness43. It was however only in the second half of 
the nineteenth century that this approach found its ideal ground and was transformed 
into imperial politics in relation to the area. It is then that both the «shadowing»44 
process with regard to the local populations, and the impression that the history of the 
major villages and cities in the region had its point zero in biblical times, gained their 
most influential formulations. 
                                                 
41 Meron Benvenisti in a roundtable transcribed in SCHAM, Paul, SALEM, Walid, POGRUND, 
Benjamin (eds.), Shared Histories, Walnut Creek, Left Coast Press, 2005, p. 85. 
42 O‟Connor clarified that «the wedge script records an inventory of sounds that is closer to that 
found in Classical Arabic (ca. 28 sounds) than to that found in Biblical Hebrew (ca. 22 sounds)». 
O‟CONNOR, Michael, Epigraphic Semitic Scripts, in BRIGHT, William, DANIELS, Peter (eds.), 
The World’s Writing System, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, , pp. 88-107, p. 92. Arabic 
has the same «sound system as Cana‟nite, reflected in the 28-sign alphabets of both. Ugaritic 
also has the same sounds, except that the 30-sign alphabet has three signs for the aleph: ā, ū, ē. 
As the only live language in the region for many centuries, Arabic can be said to be the 
storehouse containing the inventories of the earlier languages». RA‟AD, Basem L., Hidden 
histories, London, Pluto, 2010, p. 187. 
43 Plenty of works exist on Ortelius‟s maps and his approach. See for instance HAYDEN, Judy, 
MATAR, Nabil (eds.), Through the Eyes of the Beholder: The Holy Land, 1517–1713, Leiden, 
Brill, 2013. 
44 The local inhabitants – Arab-Palestinian majority, Jewish minority and other sections of the 
population – were often portrayed as a simple appendix to the ancient biblical scenery. «Every 
object», commented London painter William Henry Bartlett (1809-54) about the Jaffa area, «is 
novel and Oriental in character, and independent of its picturesque beauty, is linked by a 
delicious association with our earliest dreams of Biblical scenery and incident». BARTLETT, 
William Henry, Walks about the City and Environs of Jerusalem, London, Virtue, 1844, p. 9. 
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Today this complex past is very often downplayed of ignored, and both the idea of 
Palestine and Palestinians are presented as if they were, and in some cases still are, 
abstract concepts. Bernard Lewis, for instance, argued in his From Babel to 
Dragomans that «the word Palestine survived briefly in the early Arab Empire and 
then disappeared»45. Israeli Tourism Minister Uzi Landau recently asserted that 
Palestinians «never existed as a nation [but] suddenly everyone talks about a state»46. 
In a recent paper published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affaire (JCPA), 
anthropologist Gideon M. Kressel and historian Reuven Aharoni contended «that a 
significant portion of the Palestinian Arabs came from Egypt»47, while archaeologist 
Randall Price argued that «there was no national “Palestine” nor were there 
“Palestinians” who had a distinct identity or private ownership of “Palestinian” land»48. 
The impressions conveyed by this and many other similar claims is that the West 
created artificial nations. This brings our minds once again back to the solipsistic 
attitudes that were common in the post-World War I‟s days, when Mark Sykes pointed 
out that «there is one Palestine for the Jews, that is the home of the Jewish nation. But 
there is a Palestine for the Armenians, it is Armenia. There is a Palestine for the 
Arabians, it is Arabia»49. 
Palestinian poet Mahmud Darwish (1941-2008) used seven words to indirectly 
clarify most of the „misunderstandings‟ mentioned up to this point. «Who are they?», 
he asked in his Une rime pour les Mu’allaqat in regard to the local populations under 
Ottoman rule, «That‟s someone else‟s problem»50. In many respects this was indeed a 
problem of «others», of people externals to the region. What made the difference for 
the «insiders» was, besides religion, the provenance from a certain village (which often 
represented a sort of «protonation in the protonation»), the belonging to a specific 
hamula (family clan), the use of a particular dialect, a way of dressing, a product of the 
                                                 
45 LEWIS, Bernard, From Babel to Dragomans, London, Phoenix, 2005, p. 191. Assaf Likhovski 
noted that prior to 1917 Palestine «was merely a geographical term». LIKHOVSKI, Assaf, Law 
and Identity in Mandate Palestine, Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2006, p. 10. 
46 MUALEM, Mazal, «Israeli Minister: „A Palestinian State Is not the Solution‟», in al-Monitor, 
29 May 2013, URL: < http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/israeli-minister-
two-states-for-two-people-will-not-bring-p.html > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
47 KRESSEL, Gideon M., AHARONI, Reuven, Egyptian Émigrés in the Levant of the 19th and 
20th Centuries, Jerusalem, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2013, p. 3, URL:  
< http://jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Egypt2.pdf > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
48 PRICE, Randall, Fast Facts on the Middle East Conflict, Harvest, Eugene, 2003, p. 23.  
49 Cit. in NISAN, Mordechai, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-
Expression, Jefferson, McFarland, 2002, p. 7. 
50 DARWISH, Mahmoud, La terre nous est étroite et autres poèmes, 1966-1999, Paris, 
Gallimard, 2000 (translation by Elias Sanbar). 
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earth, a religious festival, a dance (dabkeh)51. The Nabi Musa festival, which every year 
gathered thousand of people coming primarily from areas in present-day Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, was for instance the expression of a clear emerging «proto-
national cohesion»52.  
Before the imposition of the nationalist ideologies and the emergence of exclusivist 
approaches, it was these factors, not primarily political identity, that defined 
«Palestinianness»53. These characteristics form the «rudiments of a nation» in Anthony 
Smith‟s sense of the concept54 – a set of identifiers so fundamental and so long-existing, 
so taken for granted, that virtually no one had any need to investigate. «The whole 
game of identity definition», Meron Benvenisti noted, «reflects the immigrant‟s lack of 
connection. Natives don‟t question their identity»55. 
Among the local majority different senses of identities (connected to religious, local, 
transnational and family allegiances) coexisted, without any contradiction between 
them.56 They were identities as both distinguishable and overlapping. As Barnett and 
Telhami pointed out, one of the ways in which the entire region differs from others «is 
that the national identity has had a transnational character»57. 
This transnational character and overlapping identities were not in contradiction 
with a strong attachment to the land. Elizabeth Finn (1825–1921), wife of the second 
British consul in Jerusalem, witnessed that the local fellahin (farmers) were attached to 
                                                 
51 In late Ottoman Palestine, Dabkeh and other characteristic dances were more than simple 
celebrations. They also represented a genuine expression of a «collectivization of trauma». 
ROWE, Nicholas, Raising Dust. A Cultural History of Dance in Palestine, London, I.B. Tauris, 
2010, p. 53. George Ibrahim, director of the Al-Kasaba theatre in Ramallah, believes that dancing 
and acting are also and above all useful tools to express the «collective malaise of a nation». 
IBRAHIM, George, Interview with the author, Ramallah, 13 February 2010. 
52 The Nabi Musa festival was designed to commemorate the traumatic events related to the 
Crusades. See AL-ASALI, Kamil, Mawsim al-Nabi Musa fi Filastin: Tarikh al-Mawsim wa ‘l-
Maqam [The Nabi Musa Festival in Palestine: the History of the Festival and of the Shrine], 
Amman, Dar al-Karmil, 1990 ; BARGHUTI, „Umar Salih, Al-Marahil [Turning Points], Beirut, 
al-Mu‟assasa al-‟Arabiya lil-Dirasa wa „l-Nashr, 2001, pp. 76-77. Just after World War I it 
became a political tool used by Arab leaders to test the degree of Arab resentment as a political 
manifestation. See MAZZA, Roberto, Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British, London, I.B. 
Tauris, 2009, pp. 165-178. 
53 Some aspects connected to this have been analyzed by FISHMAN, Louis, GRATIEN, Chris, 
and GÜRKAN, Emrah Safa, «Palestinianism and Zionism during the late-Ottoman period», in 
Ottoman History Podcast, 84, 16 December 2012, URL:  
<http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2012/12/palestine-zionism-settlement-
nationalism.html > [consulted on 14 February 2016]. 
54 SMITH, Adam, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 25 and 72. 
55 BENVENISTI, Meron, Son of the Cypresses, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007, p. 
233. 
56 KHALIDI, Rashid, Palestinian Identity, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 19. 
57 TELHAMI, Shibley, BARNETT, Michael (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East, New York, Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 19.  
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their land «with the tenacity of aboriginal inhabitants».58 Most of the Arab Palestinians 
that a number of scholars still define as «foreigners», or «former invaders», were thus 
people deeply rooted59 in what Khayr al-Din al-Ramli (1585–1671), an influential 
Islamic lawyer from Ramla, defined in the seventeenth century as «Filastin biladuna» 
(«Palestine our country»)60; this is not a way to suggest that a fully-defined territorially 
identity existed, but the fact that it was not a separate political and administrative 
entity did not make al-Ramli‟s «Filastin» less real.  
As for the relevant majority among those whose origins were from other areas, they 
lived in the context of a bordless region. In the JCPA‟s paper mentoned above, Kressel 
and Aharoni clarified that in the southern coastal plain, in Wadi „Ara, Palestinian 
families «called Tantawi (or Tamtawi) hailed from the area of the city of Tanta in the 
Nile Delta»61. Similar claims can be made also for other family names such as Masri, 
Dumyati, Sa‟idi and Jabali. These aspects, however, have little meaning if evaluated 
outside of their regional context. In Damascus, as well as in several other cities in the 
region, it is still possible to encounter plenty of local families with names whose origins 
show clear links to areas in present-day Israel and the Palestinian territories. This 
further proves that considering the movements within the broader region as migratory 
processes among reciprocally «foreign» populations, is a simplistic way to define a 
reality that was anything but simple. The Palestinian context, in other words, was/is an 
integral part of the Arab world without erasing for this its peculiarities. In Adel 
Manna‟s words: 
 
A Palestinian who moved to south Lebanon or a Lebanese who moved to Palestine 
– or a Syrian or a Jordanian, for that matter – is surely not a foreigner because he 
is part of the culture of the society of Bilad-al-Sham, or Greater Syria, where there 
were no borders between countries. [...] It was common and natural for a 
Palestinian to go study in Al Azhar for instance, and remain there; or for a 
                                                 
58 FINN, Elizabeth, The fellaheen of Palestine, in THE COMMITTEE OF THE PEF, The Surveys 
of Western Palestine: Special Papers on Topography, Archaeology, Manners and Customs, 
London, PEF, 1881, p. 333. Finn highlighted the lack of «national cohesion» among the 
peasants. However, he added that «no clan has for a long time overpassed the boundaries of its 
own district, and they show no disposition to do so. […] Nothing but the strong arm of 
government can ever induce a Fellah to quit his native village». Ibidem. 
59 «The Fellahin», argued CMS missionary C.T. Wilson in 1905, «have a great love for their 
native place and think it is a real hardship to have to settle elsewhere». WILSON, Charles 
Thomas, Peasant life in the Holy Land, London, Murray, 1906, p. 85. This explains why 
Palestinian surnames often include the village of origin: Nabulsi, Ramli, Rantissi and so on.  
60 AL-RAMLI, Khayr al-Din, Al-fatawa al-Khayriyya li-naf al-bariyya [Consolatory Legal 
Response in favor of the Creation], vol. 2, Cairo, Dar al-Ma‟rifa, 1858, pp. 151-160.  
61 KRESSEL, Gideon M., AHARONI, Reuven, op. cit., p. 25. 
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Hebronite merchant to go to Cairo and live there; or go to Damascus or other 
places, whether to study or to live. [...] This was a natural phenomenon62. 
 
4. Breaking the standardization process: getting back into history 
 
Following a complex process, in these last few years large sectors of the Palestinian 
society have demonstrated a willingness to tackle and regain possession of their 
simplified past, as well as a readiness to concretise what Ignatieff would have defined 
their «desire to master time‟s losses»63. The ongoing process that in the last ten/fifteen 
years is leading to the creation of the first Palestinian archives and to develop 
techniques and methods for analyzing oral history64, can be seen as an attempt by the 
Palestinians themselves to break the vicious cycle triggered by the «process of 
standardization», bringing back their own experiences into a history written from 
«below» by means of their voices and life experiences. As argued by Beshara Doumani, 
this process is far from being circumscribed to the Palestinian context: 
 
Archive fever is spreading among Palestinians everywhere. Whether in Ramallah or 
London, Haifa or San Francisco, Beirut or Riyad, someone or some group is busy 
interviewing old people and compiling genealogies, searching for photographs and 
letters, collecting textiles and folksongs, visiting and renovating graveyards, 
scanning and repairing manuscripts, and compiling information on old houses and 
destroyed villages, and this is but the tip of an iceberg whose full dimensions can 
hardly be imagined65. 
 
Today we are witnessing the convergent efforts that broad sections of the 
Palestinian society, as well as other populations in the region, are making so that it 
won‟t be only «external archives» (British, Israeli, Turkish, Russian and American, as 
well as those of the UN),66 or the political agendas of Arab countries, to speak or act on 
                                                 
62 MANNA, Adel, Discussion 1, in SCHAM, Paul, SALEM, Walid, POGRUND, Benjamin (eds.), 
op. cit., p. 34. 
63 IGNATIEFF, Michael, The Russian Album, New York, Picador, 2001, p. 5. 
64 According to Sherna Gluck, when publishing online oral testimoniances, an oral historian 
becomes an «unwitting archivist». GLUCK, Sherna, Reflections on the Promises and Perils of 
Online Archiving, presentation delivered at Birzeit University, 25 March 2014 (excerpt). 
65 DOUMANI, Beshara, «Archiving Palestine and the Palestinians: the Patrimony of Ihsan 
Nimr», in Jerusalem Quarterly, 36, 2009, p. 3. On Palestinian archives see also the works of 
Vincent Lemire, including LEMIRE, Vincent, Jérusalem 1900: La ville sainte à l’âge des 
possibles, Paris, Armand Colin, 2013. 
66 The United Nations Archives (UNA) in New York and the UNRWA offices in Amman, Gaza 
and Jerusalem, are principally repositories of documents, videos and photos about post-1948 
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their behalf. So that it will no longer be only museums such as the Palestine 
Archaeology Museum (today the Rockefeller Museum),67 – one of the main 
archaeological museums from colonial times – or archaeological excavations which are 
almost always conducted by Western and/or Israeli researchers, to explain the history 
of their land. 
In line with these considerations, Rami Hamdallah, serving at the time of the 
interview as rector at Nablus‟s al-Najah University, underlined that in certain contexts, 
Palestine included, education, archives and libraries are «the basis of everything. They 
are the instruments of survival»68. The director of the Department of Antiquities and 
Cultural Heritage (DACH)69 of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Hamdan 
Taha, who took part in several excavations in the Nāblus area, explained that 
archaeology gives «Palestinians the opportunity to participate in writing or rewriting 
the history of Palestine from its primary sources»70. Nazmi Jubeh, director of the 
History and Archaeology Department at Birzeit University, stated that «the creation, 
maintenance and accessibility of archives are meaningful aspects in the struggle for 
self-determination»71. Mustafā Barghūtī, leader of al-Mubadara (The Initiative) party, 
complained that many persons outside the Palestinian territories believe that his 
people is «incapable of taking their own past and future into their own hands, that is 
unable to establish state institutions, archives and research centres worthy of the name, 
or of appreciating full democracy»72. „Adli Ya‟ish, mayor of Nablus since 2005, argued 
that «there will be no hypothetical reconciliation between us and the Israelis as long as 
                                                                                                                                               
and post-1967 Palestinian refugees. An additional part of the documents focuses on the 
administrative and legal aspects of the UN programmes, as well as on children‟s conditions after 
1948. According to a UN report of August, 19, 1948, based on data supplied by Andrew W. 
Cordier (executive assistant to the UN Secretary), 300-400.000 children became refugees that 
year. UNA S-0158-0005-05. 
67 The Palestine Archaeological Museum was opened in 1938 as a result of the efforts of J.H. 
Breasted (1865-1935), the support of J.D. Rockefeller (1874-1960) and the encouragement of the 
then British High Commissioner in Palestine Lord Plumer (1857-1932). As the documentation in 
the museum reports, it was set up «to host the Department of Antiquities, a vast archaeological 
library and the archives». 
68 HAMDALLAH, Rami, Interview with the author, Al-Najah University, Nablus, 19 May 2010. 
69 DACH, funded mainly by European donors, was established in 2002 following the merging of 
two departments set up in 1994 by the PNA as part of the Oslo process; according to Taha, «it is 
considered an official comeback to history after several attempts of historical banishment». 
TAHA, Hamdan, «Managing Cultural Heritage in Palestine», in UNDP Focus, 1, 2004, p. 31. 
70 KESSLER, Oren, «Excavations done at former Israelite capital Shechem», in The Jerusalem 
Post, 25 July 2011, URL: < http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Excavations-done-at-former-
Israelite-capital-Shechem > [consulted on 14 February 2016].  
71 JUBEH, Nazmi, Interview with the author, Birzeit University, Ramallah, 12 January 2012. 
72 BARGHUTI, Mustafa, Interview with the author, Palestinian Medical Relief Society, 
Ramallah, 24 November 2009. 
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it is exclusively the “others” who speak of our present and our past»73.  
The excerpts just mentioned, that are part of a survey conducted by the author in 
Israel and the Palestinian territories, confirm the existence of a common drive to focus 
on these issues. The latter have also been analyzed in an unprecedented international 
conference organized on March 24-25, 2014, at Birzeit University. During the meeting, 
entitled «Globalizing Palestine: Birzeit University‟s Archive in an International 
Perspective – Towards a Chaotic Order», several presentations have shed also light on 
the getting back into history process that the Palestinian society in particular, and the 




Unlike Medieval societies, characterized by a sum of particularisms, the era of the 
nation-states tended toward the homogenization of diversities. What in modern Europe 
was often indicated as a «nation» (from the latin natus, «to be born») presupposed in 
fact a feeling of belonging to a defined community that differed, as a result of «mutual 
contact» between distinct groups, at a linguistic, cultural and territorial level. It 
presumed, in other words, a cleavage between «us» and «them»74. 
Such a «border» was much more nuanced in the Eastern Mediterranean. In many 
documents of the 1700 and 1800s it is possible to find a distinction between ibn ‘Arab 
(Arab son) and ibn Turk (Turkish son). This means that often the local populations 
considered the non-Arabic-speaking Turks as foreigners. At the same time, the origin 
from a certain village, the hamula of belonging and the local customs were all factors 
which marked a certain distinction between the protonations present in the region. As 
Jacob L. Burkhardt (1818-1897) noted in 1822, «it would be an interesting subject for 
an artist to portray accurately the different character of features of the Syrian nations, 
[...] a slight acquaintance with them enables one to determine the native district of a 
Syrian, with almost as much certainty as an Englishman may be distinguished at first 
sight from an Italian or an inhabitant of the South of France»75. 
And yet, external dangers, which are very often the basis of the need of a people to 
                                                 
73 YA‟ISH, „Adli, Interview with the author, The Mayor‟s Office, Nablus, 20 May 2010. 
74 Said argued that «the development and conservation of every culture requires the existence of 
an alter ego different and in competition with it. The construction of identity [...] implies the 
construction of opposites and of “others”, whose present is always subject to continuous 
interpretation and reinterpretation of that which differentiates them from us». SAID, Edward, 
Orientalism, New York, Vintage, 1994, pp. 331-332.  
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define itself in a clear-cut way, were largely missing until the growing Western 
enchroachment on the region. Even in the European context, mutatis mutandis, it was 
for instance the anti-Napoleonic mass mobilization that contributed to transform 
Russia into a nation that was no longer simply identifiable with the Tsar‟s rule. In 
Germany, in the year of the French Siege of Mainz (1793) Goethe (1749-1832) turned to 
the German Volk76 and no longer to the Holy Roman Empire. The nation-state of the 
modern era should thus be considered as a phenomenon that had its origin and 
destination mainly, but of course not only, in «the defence of the community from 
potential external aggression»77. 
Until a relatively recent past, Iraqis, Syrians, Palestinians were not in need of 
borders that could divide their Heimat – which in German does not refer to one‟s 
country or nation, two abstract ideas that are too far-reaching and distant, but rather to 
a place in which our most profound memories are rooted. But this should not suggest 
that the various local fluid regional and religious identities were deprived of peculiar, if 
not «protonational», characteristics, or that they and their states are simply «Western 
artificial creations». The history of the region is indeed one of variegation, multiplicity 
and localisms: many of the modern states in the Eastern Mediterranean are rooted in 
peculiar historical legacies. To overlook or deny this aspect means to simplify, once 
again, the complex history of the region. 
Hamid Dabashi noted that the «postcolonial did not overcome the colonial; it 
exacerbated it by negation»78. His words fit best the IS and the present-day history of 
the region. Each of the peoples in the region are now expected, or are already 
struggling, to break the vicious cycle triggered by the double «process of simplification» 
imposed on them by the Sykes-Picot and the IS‟s orders and narratives, and to find 
their own peculiar ways to get back into history, rediscovering the permeabilities and 
the specificities that for millennia characterized the daily life in the region. 
 
                                                 
76 See BAYLY, Christopher, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004.  
77 ARCHIBUGI, Daniele, VOLTAGGIO, Franco, Filosofi per la pace [Philosophers for peace], 
Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1999, p. XVI. 
78 DABASHI, Hamid, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism, New York, Zed Books, 
2012, p. XVII. 
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